時(shí)間：12月29日（星期二）上午9:00-10:30
會(huì)議號(hào)：騰訊會(huì)議209 499 242
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
Hsing Kenneth Cheng教授是佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)John B. Higdon杰出學(xué)者、Warrington商學(xué)院信息系統(tǒng)和運(yùn)營(yíng)管理系系主任。他于1992年獲得羅徹斯特大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)與信息系統(tǒng)博士學(xué)位。鄭教授的主要研究方向?yàn)榛ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)對(duì)軟件開發(fā)和市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷的影響分析、信息系統(tǒng)政策問(wèn)題（特別是關(guān)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)中立性的全國(guó)辯論）?；谠谇叭畔⑾到y(tǒng)期刊上發(fā)表的論文，鄭教授在全球信息系統(tǒng)100名研究人員中排名第20位(2009-2011年)和第16位(2010-2012年)。鄭教授目前任Decision Sciences副主編， Journal of the Association for Information Systems、Information Systems and electronic Management高級(jí)編輯。2011-2014年擔(dān)任Information Systems Research副主編，曾任職于許多信息系統(tǒng)會(huì)議和研討會(huì)的項(xiàng)目委員會(huì)，并擔(dān)任Workshop on E-Business (2003年，2012年)和Taiwan Summer Workshop on Information Management項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合主席。
報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass 740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform's traditional role as a platform into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers. The platform's unfair anti- competitive practice further aggravates the situation. Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand product in order to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two research questions of critical interest to both the policy makers and the incumbent sellers. First, is the platform's introducing its own brand product always detrimental to the incumbent sellers? Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform's own brand introduction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with own brand introduction that always hurts the sellers. Interestingly, when the own brand introduction is banned under the sell-to contract, the incumbent sellers can be better off because the platform's strategic reaction to the enforcement can lead to the best scenario for the incumbent sellers. If the ban is imposed on both the sell-on and sell-to contracts, the platform's best response is to add another new brand competing with the incumbent sellers, which can also help the incumbent sellers, however, not as much as in the case of the enforcement only under the sell-to contract.
（承辦：管理工程系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
