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        1. ENGLISH
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          【明理講堂2022年第64期】12-28美國(guó)德克薩斯大學(xué)達(dá)拉斯分校Jianqing Chen教授:Sponsored Tasks and Solver Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests

          時(shí)間:12月28號(hào)(周三) 上午10:00-11:30

          會(huì)議號(hào):#騰訊會(huì)議:229-899-373

          報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介:

          Crowdsourcing platforms provide venues for firms looking for solutions (seekers) to interact with individuals who can provide solutions (solvers). As crowdsourcing contest platforms have grown in popularity with numerous tasks being posted on a daily basis, a concern that has emerged is that many similar tasks compete for solver attention, with some tasks failing to attract sufficient solver participation. To alleviate such a concern, in addition to regular task listings, many crowdsourcing platforms offer sponsorship programs under which seekers pay an extra fee for highlighting their tasks to draw solvers’ attention. We examine the effect of sponsorship on solver participation using a unique data set collected from a leading crowdsourcing platform. In contrast to platforms’ claims about the effect of sponsorship on participation, we find that sponsorship does not always boost participation in crowdsourcing contests; sponsorship increases the number of participants only when the prize amount for a task is already high. Furthermore, even when the number of participants increases, the increase primarily comes from low-ability solvers. We also find that when sponsorship increases the total number of submissions, it does so only through increasing the number of participants; sponsorship does not increase the number of submissions individual solvers submit after joining a task. A more granular analysis reveals an effect of anticipated increased competition caused by sponsorship on high-ability solvers but not on those of low ability, explaining the difference in their participation decisions when facing sponsored tasks. We also find the effect of sponsorship weakens over the duration of a task for high-ability solvers and is also weaker for solvers with more experience on the platform.

          報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介:

          陳建清(Jianqing Chen),美國(guó)德州大學(xué)達(dá)拉斯分校Naveen Jindal商學(xué)院信息系統(tǒng)系教授,在清華大學(xué)獲得學(xué)士和碩士學(xué)位,德州大學(xué)奧斯汀分校博士畢業(yè)。陳建清教授目前主要關(guān)注平臺(tái)商業(yè)模式、社交媒體和用戶產(chǎn)生內(nèi)容、搜索廣告以及信息系統(tǒng)中的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué),其多項(xiàng)研究成果在Information Systems Research, MIS Quarterly, Management Science, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, and Production and Operations Management等國(guó)際頂級(jí)學(xué)術(shù)期刊發(fā)表。他目前任Information Systems Research的副主編和Production and Operations Management的高級(jí)編輯。

          (承辦:管理工程系、長(zhǎng)三角研究院數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)創(chuàng)新研究中心、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心)

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