題目：Compete in Price or Service? – A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees
主講人：Jing Chen 副教授 （加拿大達(dá)爾豪斯大學(xué)）
時(shí)間：2016年2月23日上午10點(diǎn)
地點(diǎn)：主樓6層
主講人介紹：
陳靜博士現(xiàn)為加拿大達(dá)爾豪斯大學(xué)Rowe工商偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)運(yùn)籌及供應(yīng)鏈管理系副教授/終身教職，擔(dān)任國(guó)際期刊《International Transaction in Operational Research》（ITOR）和《International Journal of Inventory Research》副主編。在顧客退貨、供應(yīng)鏈管理和收益管理領(lǐng)域的國(guó)際期刊《European Journal of Operational Research》、《OMEGA》、《International Journal of Production Economics》、《Annals of Operations Research》上發(fā)學(xué)術(shù)論文20篇，四篇論文出版在全英文專著中（皆為與本科生合作）。主持加拿大國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目（2010-2015）和中國(guó)國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)課題一子項(xiàng)目（2014-2018）。
內(nèi)容介紹：
Retailers use both pricing and service strategies to respond to intensified competition. Here we develop a duopoly model to investigate the impact of the increasingly popular personalized pricing strategy (PPS) and the widely used Money Back Guarantee (MBG) customer returns policy. We consider two retailers who differ in customer satisfaction rates. Each retailer chooses a pricing strategy, PPS or uniform pricing, and a product return strategy, MBG or ‘no returns.’ We show that both PPS and MBG are dominant strategies, but their impact on retailers’ prices and profits are different; while PPS intensifies price competition and may lead to a “prisoner’s dilemma,” MBG mitigates price competition and may result in a Pareto improvement for the two retailers. Furthermore, when one retailer adopts either PPS or MBG, it will decrease (PPS) or increase (MBG) its own price, but in both cases the other retailer will react by cutting its (average) price. The size of the overall market will increase in both cases. The total customer surplus will increase when the two retailers have comparable customer satisfaction rates, but the total duopoly profit may not increase.
（承辦：技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)與戰(zhàn)略管理系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
