題目：Earnings Management, Ethics, and Employee Selection
主講人：Harris L. Ling（University of South Carolina）
時(shí)間：2016年5月13日15點(diǎn)
地點(diǎn)：主樓241會(huì)議室
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
Harris L. Ling 先后畢業(yè)于世界著名會(huì)計(jì)強(qiáng)校University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, 獲會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)碩士和博士學(xué)位。目前就職于著名會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)驗(yàn)研究重鎮(zhèn)University of South Carolina會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院。她有多篇成果發(fā)表于國(guó)際權(quán)威期刊 Contemporary Accounting Research和Accounting, Organizations and Society。多次在美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)和美國(guó)各個(gè)大學(xué)宣讀論文，并獲各種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
This study reports the results of three experiments that examine whether the employee selection process perpetuates earnings management. Our research design involves two hypothetical job candidates for a senior accounting position, one of which has personality characteristics that indicate a predisposition to manage earnings and the other has personality characteristics that indicate the opposite predisposition. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that, in firms facing pressure to manage earnings, the job candidate who has personality characteristics indicating a predisposition to manage earnings is favored because that person is perceived to be a better fit for the position. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that experienced executive recruiters screen out accounting job candidates who are not predisposed to manage earnings, suggesting that certain types of job candidates may never be considered for high-level accounting positions in firms that face pressure to manage earnings. The results of Experiment 3 indicate that, when financial statements are used for purposes of firm valuation versus monitoring, job candidates who are predisposed to manage earnings are favored over job candidates who are not. We also find that the personality characteristics that indicate a predisposition to manage earnings do not signal better managerial capabilities in other areas. Our results help illuminate why earnings management stubbornly persists despite decades of regulatory efforts designed to curtail that behavior.
（承辦：會(huì)計(jì)系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
